Back to campaign

Sector analysis

What is the problem, and what do we propose?

Each sector is evaluated in the same order: how the system operates today, what practical harm follows, the rule this campaign proposes, the legal foundation, and the strongest arguments on both sides.

01Current operation

Identify who controls the infrastructure, information, or essential access.

02Practical problem

Describe the consequence for a person who lacks notice, correction, voice, or exit.

03Proposed rule

Attach a proportionate duty instead of assuming every private actor is the government.

04Legal and policy test

Open the record to compare authority, benefits, objections, and implementation costs.

Problems and proposals

Review the case sector by sector.

Evidence labels describe the campaign’s current research depth, not a conclusion that every company or deployment in the sector acts unlawfully.

13sectors shown
01

Strong

Law enforcement and public safety

How it operates today

ALPR networks, facial recognition, geofence warrants, cloud evidence systems, body cameras, and investigative search platforms.

The problem

People can be stopped, questioned, investigated, watched across jurisdictions, or misidentified through systems they never directly interacted with.

What we propose

Require legal authority, audit logs, query limits, corroboration before coercive action, and redress for adverse decisions.

Evidence status

Strong: source PDFs, Flock reporting, IJ error examples, EFF public-records and cross-jurisdiction reports, Norfolk litigation.

Legal basis and the strongest arguments on both sides
Legal basis

Fourth Amendment doctrine in Jones, Riley, and Carpenter recognizes that digital scale, persistence, and aggregation can change the legal analysis. FCRA, DPPA, state ALPR laws, procurement law, and audit requirements provide statutory models without declaring every vendor a state actor.

The case for

Purpose limits, query logs, accuracy testing, and corroboration can preserve legitimate investigations while making misuse and error reviewable before a coercive action.

The case against

Agencies and vendors may argue that added approvals slow time-sensitive investigations, increase procurement costs, and expose operational details to people seeking to evade detection.

02

Strong

Transportation and mobility

How it operates today

License plate readers, toll records, vehicle databases, parking systems, rideshare/location records, and roadway camera networks.

The problem

Routine travel can become a retrospective movement history revealing work, worship, medical visits, associations, or political activity.

What we propose

Apply movement-data purpose limits, retention limits, cross-jurisdiction controls, and legal-process parity.

Evidence status

Strong: ALPR case events, Carpenter/Jones location doctrine, DPPA analogy, Illinois ALPR controversy.

Legal basis and the strongest arguments on both sides
Legal basis

Jones and Carpenter address persistent movement tracking; the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act supplies a permissible-purpose and redisclosure model. Several states separately regulate ALPR collection, access, security, and retention.

The case for

Travel histories can reveal highly sensitive associations. Short retention, documented purposes, and cross-jurisdiction controls reduce dragnet use without banning targeted searches.

The case against

Transportation agencies and police may contend that longer retention helps solve delayed-report crimes, find missing persons, and identify patterns that are invisible in short windows.

03

Strong

Housing, landlords, and residential governance

How it operates today

Apartment cameras, gated-community cameras, HOA camera networks, tenant platforms, access systems, and private security sharing.

The problem

Residents may face surveillance at home while leases, property rules, and private control limit organizing, posting, gathering, or demanding safety changes.

What we propose

Protect safety notices, resident canvassing, meetings, tenant associations, anti-retaliation, and neutral communication channels.

Evidence status

Strong: PLIESA identifies housing as a first sector; existing HUD tenant-organizing rules show the duty already exists in parts of the market.

Legal basis and the strongest arguments on both sides
Legal basis

Fair housing, state landlord-tenant law, privacy and consumer-protection statutes, and federal tenant-organizing protections in covered housing show that legislatures already impose duties when private control over a home limits realistic exit.

The case for

Home is where surveillance and private governance are hardest to avoid. Notice, organizing rights, anti-retaliation, and limits on police sharing protect both safety and resident voice.

The case against

Owners may argue that uniform duties interfere with property management, raise insurance and security costs, and make it harder to respond to trespass, theft, or violence.

04

Developing

Retail, commercial property, and private security

How it operates today

Storefront ALPR cameras, private security networks, trespass databases, theft-prevention vendors, and police-business sharing portals.

The problem

Private commercial spaces can become surveillance collection points feeding public investigation or exclusion decisions.

What we propose

Require public disclosure when private infrastructure is designed for government investigative use.

Evidence status

Developing: source reports and public ALPR imagery support the pattern; needs more vendor/customer-specific records.

Legal basis and the strongest arguments on both sides
Legal basis

The FTC Act, state consumer-protection laws, state ALPR statutes, trespass law, and government procurement conditions can regulate representations, data handling, and government-facing sharing by commercial systems.

The case for

Disclosure and access controls let customers understand when an ordinary store or parking lot also functions as a government data contributor.

The case against

Retailers may say public notices reveal security practices, create compliance burdens for mixed-use cameras, and reduce voluntary cooperation that deters theft.

05

Strong

Healthcare and reproductive care

How it operates today

Commercial location data, ALPR travel records, geofence warrants, search data, cross-state investigative requests, hospital access duties, and private health-system governance.

The problem

Medical travel and reproductive-care access can become visible to hostile jurisdictions while essential care access depends on private systems with limited exit.

What we propose

Protect sensitive medical travel, apply access and communication duties, and require legal-process parity for healthcare-adjacent data.

Evidence status

Strong: Illinois/Texas ALPR controversy, PLIESA healthcare sector analysis, ADA public-accommodation duties, and EMTALA public-service obligations.

Legal basis and the strongest arguments on both sides
Legal basis

HIPAA protects covered health information but often does not reach location brokers or other commercial data. EMTALA, disability law, medical privacy statutes, and legal-process rules provide related access and confidentiality models.

The case for

Heightened protection for medical travel and care-adjacent data prevents ordinary commercial records from becoming a route around health privacy and cross-state legal safeguards.

The case against

Broad sensitivity rules may complicate fraud investigations, emergency response, public-health work, and lawful interstate requests where location or identity evidence is genuinely relevant.

06

Developing

Immigration and border enforcement

How it operates today

Local ALPR databases, vendor-sharing networks, federal task-force access, fusion centers, and data-broker purchases.

The problem

Local infrastructure can be repurposed for federal or out-of-jurisdiction immigration enforcement without local public understanding.

What we propose

Require customer disclosure, federal-access logs, onward-transfer controls, and local opt-out authority.

Evidence status

Developing: Illinois reports and UW research support concern; needs state-by-state agency access mapping.

Legal basis and the strongest arguments on both sides
Legal basis

Federal immigration authority coexists with state and local rules governing agency resources, data disclosure, procurement, and law-enforcement databases. California’s Values Act is one example of a state information-sharing limit.

The case for

Access logs and local sharing rules allow communities to know whether locally purchased systems are being repurposed for a materially different enforcement mission.

The case against

Opponents may argue that local opt-outs obstruct federal enforcement, create inconsistent rules across jurisdictions, and prevent information sharing in serious public-safety cases.

07

Needs state research

Education and campuses

How it operates today

Campus cameras, school safety platforms, student monitoring, visitor systems, police partnerships, and emergency notification data.

The problem

Students, parents, visitors, and staff can be monitored in quasi-public civic spaces with unclear sharing and retention rules.

What we propose

Add state education privacy, campus police, procurement, and minor-data safeguards during state-law expansion.

Evidence status

Needs state research: current PDFs support the governance theory, but sector-specific evidence should be added.

Legal basis and the strongest arguments on both sides
Legal basis

FERPA, the Protection of Pupil Rights Amendment, COPPA in applicable online services, state student-privacy laws, and school procurement rules already regulate portions of the student-data environment.

The case for

Minors and students have limited bargaining power. Inventories, retention limits, parent/student notice, and strict sharing rules reduce lifelong consequences from school surveillance records.

The case against

Schools may argue that additional consent and review requirements impede safety tools, emergency coordination, threat assessment, and affordable use of shared technology platforms.

08

Strong

Digital platforms and communications

How it operates today

Social platforms, app stores, identity systems, cloud accounts, moderation rules, portability limits, and network effects.

The problem

Speech, association, organizing, commerce, and access to public debate can depend on privately governed systems that are difficult to leave.

What we propose

Require notice, explanation, appeal, portability, interoperability, nonwaiver protections, and process for account-level exclusions.

Evidence status

Strong: PLIESA identifies digital platforms as essential systems and compares interoperability/data-portability duties such as the EU Digital Markets Act.

Legal basis and the strongest arguments on both sides
Legal basis

The First Amendment generally does not bind private platforms, making legislation rather than state-action doctrine the principal route. Consumer protection, privacy, competition, portability, and interoperability laws supply existing models.

The case for

Explanation, appeal, portability, and interoperability reduce the civic cost of opaque account exclusions where a platform has become difficult to leave.

The case against

Platforms may argue that process mandates delay moderation, amplify abuse, expose ranking systems, burden smaller services, and intrude on editorial and associational rights.

09

Developing

Finance and payment access

How it operates today

Payment networks, banking access, fraud scoring, identity verification, account termination, and payment-platform terms.

The problem

People can lose practical access to commerce, rent, work, fundraising, or travel when private financial rails are unavailable or opaque.

What we propose

Add explanation, appeal, portability, anti-retaliation, and emergency access duties for essential payment functions.

Evidence status

Developing: PLIESA identifies finance as an essential system; current site needs more payment-network and banking examples.

Legal basis and the strongest arguments on both sides
Legal basis

FCRA, ECOA, electronic-funds rules, banking supervision, state money-transmission law, and consumer-protection statutes already impose accuracy, notice, dispute, and nondiscrimination duties on parts of the financial system.

The case for

A meaningful explanation and appeal can prevent opaque fraud scores or identity errors from cutting a person off from rent, work, fundraising, or essential purchases.

The case against

Financial providers may contend that detailed explanations help fraudsters, conflict with anti-money-laundering duties, and increase losses by delaying urgent account restrictions.

10

Developing

Employment and gig work

How it operates today

Background checks, workplace monitoring, location tracking, delivery/rideshare data, identity matching, and vendor risk scoring.

The problem

Errors or opaque data trails can affect hiring, discipline, platform access, licensing, or investigations without meaningful correction rights.

What we propose

Use FCRA-like access, dispute, accuracy, user-duty, portability, and anti-retaliation concepts for employment-impacting systems.

Evidence status

Developing: FCRA analogy is strong and PLIESA identifies employment as an essential system; current site needs more worker-specific examples.

Legal basis and the strongest arguments on both sides
Legal basis

FCRA regulates many employment background reports; Title VII and state employment laws address discrimination; emerging state laws govern automated employment decision tools and workplace monitoring.

The case for

Access, correction, validation, and human review give workers a practical way to challenge bad identity matches, location histories, or risk scores before losing work.

The case against

Employers and platforms may argue that expanded duties raise hiring costs, slow safety investigations, invite strategic disputes, and are difficult to apply to rapidly changing fraud signals.

11

Needs state research

Utilities and essential infrastructure

How it operates today

Electricity, water, broadband, phone access, service shutoff rules, smart meters, billing platforms, and monopoly service territories.

The problem

People can lose practical liberty when essential services are disconnected, monitored, priced opaquely, or unavailable without a realistic substitute.

What we propose

Add notice, explanation, appeal, shutoff safeguards, privacy duties, and state utility commission research.

Evidence status

Needs state research: PLIESA identifies utilities as an essential system; utility-specific duties depend heavily on state law and public utility commissions.

Legal basis and the strongest arguments on both sides
Legal basis

State public-utility law commonly uses rate review, notice, hearing, service-quality, and shutoff protections because monopoly territories leave customers without ordinary market exit.

The case for

Privacy, explanation, appeal, and shutoff safeguards extend familiar utility obligations to smart meters, broadband, automated billing, and vendor-operated service systems.

The case against

Utilities may argue that additional process delays disconnection for nonpayment, complicates grid security and outage response, and shifts compliance costs to all ratepayers.

12

Needs state research

Ecological systems and local environment

How it operates today

Private control of land, water, waste, emissions, nuisance sources, resource extraction, and cumulative environmental burdens.

The problem

Communities can lose health, property use, safety, and practical mobility when private actors externalize harm into shared environmental systems.

What we propose

Connect public-trust, nuisance, cumulative-impact review, anti-retaliation, and local environmental justice remedies.

Evidence status

Needs state research: PLIESA points to public-trust, nuisance, environmental, and cumulative-impact concepts; local examples should be added.

Legal basis and the strongest arguments on both sides
Legal basis

Nuisance, public-trust principles, environmental review, the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, and state cumulative-impact laws provide mechanisms for harms that are externalized into shared systems.

The case for

Cumulative-impact review and anti-retaliation rules address harms that appear modest one permit at a time but materially constrain health, property use, and mobility in combination.

The case against

Industry may argue that broader impact tests duplicate environmental permitting, introduce uncertain standards, delay infrastructure, and make firms responsible for harms beyond their control.

13

Developing

Civic participation, protest, and association

How it operates today

Location histories, ALPR event-area searches, facial recognition, social-platform records, and private venue surveillance.

The problem

People may avoid meetings, protests, worship, mutual aid, clinics, or political events if attendance can be reconstructed later.

What we propose

Require heightened safeguards for First Amendment-sensitive locations, events, associations, and reverse searches.

Evidence status

Strong conceptually: Katz/Jones/Carpenter/Chatrie and the source reports support the chilling-effect frame; needs more campaign-specific examples.

Legal basis and the strongest arguments on both sides
Legal basis

The First Amendment, NAACP v. Alabama associational privacy, and the movement-data reasoning in Jones and Carpenter support heightened concern when records reveal attendance at political, religious, or civic events.

The case for

Sensitive-location and event safeguards reduce chilling effects while allowing particularized investigation supported by appropriate legal authority.

The case against

Law enforcement may argue that event-based limits create blind spots around violence, threats, trafficking, or coordinated crime and make neutral records harder to use consistently.